110609 ‘Arab Spring’ takes toll on Moroccan economy | ‘الربيع العربي’ يلقي بظلاله على الاقتصاد المغربي | Le Printemps arabe coûte à l’économie marocaine by Magharbia s licensed under CC BY 2.0
“The People Want to Overthrow the Regime”
الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام
In 2011, a series of uprisings in the form of pro-democracy protests began to appear after the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia which is now recognized as the beginning of the Arab Spring. The resulting protests in Tunisia and the successful abdication of the then-dictator and president, Ben Ali, created a domino effect that cascaded throughout Middle Eastern states and North Africa. The Arab Spring is commonly viewed as a single revolutionary event, as the timing of the events seems to suggest so and were cataloged as a revolution catalyzed by young people protesting against the oppressive regimes that ruled the region. This, however, is a common misconception. Many of the states involved in the Arab Spring had shared revolutionary situations and environments but varied in their disparate revolutionary outcomes. Theorists such as Ted Gurr, Charles Tilly, and Chalmers Johnson give us proper insight into how to analyze why these revolutionary situations turned into the many disparate revolutionary outcomes seen today.
Theories
Using the theories of popular revolutionary theorists helps better conceptualize and analyze the Arab Spring. The theories of revolution by Ted Gurr, Charles Tilly, and Chalmers Johnson are inherently important in analyzing the revolutionary situations and outcomes of the Arab Spring. Ted Gurr claims that revolutions occur because of relative deprivation which is when there is a discrepancy between a person’s value expectations and their value capabilities (Gurr, 1970). There are three types of relative deprivation. The most pertinent relative deprivation to the Arab Spring is aspirational deprivation which is when expectations of value capabilities grow while their ability to meet those capabilities remains the same (Gurr, 1970). Charles Tilly makes key distinctions between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes (Tilly, 1993). The three most important causes of a revolutionary theory according to Tilly are the appearance of a revolutionary coalition challenging to control the state (multiple sovereignty), a devotion to that challenge by relinquishing citizenship, and a weak government that is either unwilling or unable to suppress the revolutionary coalition (Tilly, 1993). The causes of revolutionary outcomes according to Tilly are the defection of elites, neutralization of the armed forces, and control of the state by the revolutionary coalition (Tilly, 1993). Chalmers Johnson focuses on four categories of revolutionary theories. The most applicable to the Arab Spring is his process theory (Johnson, 1966). Johnson’s process theory is not a theory of any particular revolution, rather a set of guiding principles to model revolutions. (Johnson, 1966). The main principles being the level of structural distortion, level of conscious political choice, and the level of strategy (Johnson, 1966).
Revolutionary Situation
What was the common environment or revolutionary situation that led the states of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and several others to revolution and political violence? Gurr, Tilly, and Johnson all focus on the critical idea that revolutionary situations occur when a weak state does not meet the needs of the people, which firmly explains the overarching revolutionary situation in the Middle East at the time. The states involved in the Arab Spring shared numerous characteristics that made them ripe for revolution. Including, but not limited to, aging leaders, authoritarian tendencies, unbounded corruption, ineffectual governments, economic turmoil, and mass inequality. The citizens of these states also shared similar characteristics that aided in the creation of a revolutionary situation. The actors within these states suffered from a relative deprivation created by the oppressive and authoritarian regimes that characterized the political landscape of the Middle East at the time. More specifically they suffered from aspirational deprivation (Gurr, 1970). Most Arab Spring states had a large share of educated, yet unemployed youth that felt disaffected with the current regime’s ability to provide an environment for which they could thrive.
For example, in Tunisia increasing numbers of college graduates could not find employment, economic corruption was rampant, and the cost of living skyrocketed. Egypt faced a growing population of educated young people that could not find employment, poor living standards for most Egyptians, and a corruption-plagued government. Libya and Syria faced increasing unemployment and economic problems because of their natural resource-based economies which consequently led to increased corruption as government officials siphoned money from oil profits for themselves (Pendergast, 2011). In Yemen half of the population was living under the poverty line and one-third was living in chronic hunger (CIA, 2014). Free speech, free press, and criticism of the government was met with violence and arrests in many of these states leaving a democratic deficit. Effectively neutralizing people’s avenues to express their dissatisfaction with their government other than protest.
The perpetual weaknesses of these states to meet the growing expectations of their people resulted in an environment that was on the brink of a revolution. In terms of Tilly, the Arab Spring states weak governments and social processes where the government elite are structured to succeed while the subject populations live in turmoil created the revolutionary situation. In terms of Gurr, the aspirational deprivation seen in these states led to the creation of the revolutionary situation, and in terms of Johnson, the disconnect between the values of the people and the government created the revolutionary situation. Even though all of these states shared a similar revolutionary situation, the small variabilities seen in the structure of the institutions, demographics, culture, and ultimately the uprisings, led to a series of disparate revolutionary outcomes. Three of the most relevant case studies that show these disparate revolutionary outcomes are Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria.
Revolutionary Outcomes
Tunisia
Tunisia is one of the starkest examples of Gurr’s theory of aspirational deprivation. There was a growing population of educated youth that was unable to gain the employment and economic opportunity that they felt they deserved. In the years leading up to the revolution, fourteen percent of Tunisians were unemployed, and a majority of those people were between the ages of 15-24. To add to the deprivation, 45% of college graduates could not find employment and households were spending over one-third of their income just on food (Schraeder, Redissi, 2011). Unemployment and high living costs coupled with the fact that the government was doing nothing to meet these expectations lead to an increasing sense of depravity at the hands of Ben Ali. The Ben Ali family at this time owned over 180 of the major companies in Tunisia and 50% of the commercial elites were related to Ben Ali (Anderson, 2011). The combination of a disaffected and educated youth, economic hardship, an extreme inequality perpetrated by the Ali family, and the unwillingness to reform by the government meant that the Tuni’s value expectations were growing while the government’s willingness to meet those expectations stagnated.
Why was Tunisia the only Arab Spring state to result in a democracy? The revolutionary situation was not drastically different than other Arab Spring states, however, variabilities within the structure of Tunisia and the events that took place during and directly after the demonstrations led to an environment conducive for democracy. When analyzing this seemingly rare revolutionary outcome it is important to understand Tilly’s theory of revolutions in which he states the proximate causes of outcome are dependent on actions taken by the elite and the armed forces (Tilly, 1993). Comparatively, the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia was relatively peaceful and only about 300 people died throughout the protests. When Ben Ali ordered the military to use deadly force against the protestors the General at the time, Rachid Ammar, refused and arrested the head of Ben Ali’s presidential guard who was planning to grab power for himself (Schraeder, Redissi, 2011). The military continued to act as an ally to the protestors by securing the major cities and protecting them. The military also insisted upon remaining apolitical while they assisted the protestors in removing the rest of the presidential guard and Ben Ali sympathizers (Schraeder, Redissi, 2011). The actions taken by the Tunisian military had an immense and consequential impact on the outcome of the revolution. Because the military did not try to grab power as it did in Egypt and acted as the armed forces of the Tunisian people rather than acting as the armed forces of Ben Ali, the old regime was forced to step down. The Jasmine Revolution does not meet Tilly’s criteria for multiple sovereignty, but the new polity that was being demanded by protestors was able to take power with the help of the military. The actions taken by the military in Tunisia set the path for a democratic outcome.
Tilly also stressed that revolutionary outcomes were dependent upon whether or not the revolutionary coalition was in power of the government and that in some cases revolutions do not present multiple sovereignty and that the transfer of power to the revolutionary coalition is gradual (Tilly, 1993). In Tunisia after the protest that ousted Ben Ali, a transitional government was put in place made up of members from the old regime. However, this did not sit well with the Tunisia people who did not want a repeat of the old regime. This transitional government stayed in power until February 27, when the leaders stepped down due to popular demand, and a new government led by Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi was instated. This marked a key indicator of democracy, a peaceful transition of power. This series of events shows a gradual transfer of power from the old regime to the revolutionary coalition led by Béji Caïd Essebsi, an outspoken critic of Ben Ali. He led the charge in banning Ben Ali’s RCD party, arresting regime hard-liners, and abolished the political police. The combination of multiple variables allowed Tunisia to successfully revolt against their oppressive leader and create a democratic government. The actions taken by the military to side with the protesters and the subsequent peaceful transfers of power shaped the revolutionary outcome to one that would lead to the democratization of Tunisia.
Egypt
In Cairo, Egypt, 2011 was filled with civil unrest and a demand for change within its government. The revolt in Tunisia, the first state to turn against its leaders for their wrongdoings, sparked a flame in young and well-educated Egyptians to call for the removal of President Hosni Mubarak, making Egypt the second nation to push for change in the Arab Spring. Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for nearly 30 years without any democratic election, ruled with near-absolute control over his people, fundamentally infringing on the rights of a democracy (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). While these protests are based on economic reasons rather than democratic reasons, the people still demanded his removal and a democratic election. Under Mubarak, Egyptians faced a significant rise in inflation, unemployment, and poverty rates, making many unable to find jobs. Due to this growing hatred for Mubarak within the youth population, inevitably leading to the fear barrier being broken and these protests taking to the streets. Inflation and massive unemployment rates poverty led Egyptians to seek massive governmental reform (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). The new generation of young Egyptians recognized this as inhumane treatment and knew they had to speak up soon or else all of their rights would be gone. The government further angered the populace by infringing on personal freedoms, enacting a 6 o’clock curfew, and closing internet cafes, restricting many Egyptians access to the internet (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). This further escalated protest, leading to the death of Khaled Said, a young man who was forcibly removed from an internet café during a protest and brutally killed in the street.
This young generation of Egyptians, who are familiar with modern democracy and the impact it has on foreign countries, continued to push for change and after foreign media brought this deprivation to light, the protests came to an end. The common goal, which first began with small protests, became reality and in February of 2011 President Hosni Mubarak was pushed to forcibly resign from office leading Egypt into a democratic election for the first time since Mubarak took office, leaving the government up to the Supreme Council of Armed forces (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019).
Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation was relevant during the protests in Egypt. Relative Deprivation “is defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, P.24). This theory is used because the populace feels basic human rights and access to goods and services are being restricted by that populace’s government or leaders which creates a motivation for change (Gurr, 1970). This is exactly what happens to the people of Egypt as well as other countries in the Arab Spring. For example, in Libya, President Muammar Gaddafi introduced an extreme socialist policy by the name of Jamahiriya (state of the masses) (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). This was a practice in which the people are actively involved in decision making within the government. With this in place, this meant that private ownership, trade, and freedom of the press was deemed illegal in fear of retaliation to a strong government. Radical Islamists banded together in 1990 to fight against the regime in which they were unsuccessful. In 2011, peaceful protesters gathered in Benghazi to demand democratic reform and the ending of political corruption. From this demonstration two protesters were arrested which was great press for the citizens of Libya (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). To combat opposition to the government, Gaddafi censored television and other major media outlets (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019) so that the public could not get other ideas about leadership that seemed more ideal than the current situation. Libyans felt that if Gaddafi can pull off this authoritarian regime without backlash, other countries such as Egypt, and Tunisia for example, would implement these practices on their respective populace.
The same goes for the demonstrators, if they were able to knock down the authority other countries would see that it is possible to fight for their rights and not kneel before unjust power. In March of 2011, The Security Council of the United Nation passed a resolution that legalized the use of any means possible to end the killing of the oppressive government (Korotayev, Shishkina, 2019). This was a huge step forward, as it allowed the people of Libya to fight back and not face death. Finally, in August of said year, Gaddafi was captured and killed publicly which ended the mass oppression of Libyans and set the example that people united can overcome the adversity of mass scale.
Syria
When examining the political unrest and civil war in Syria under the authoritarian rule of Bashar al-Asaad during the Arab Spring, it is necessary to delve deeper into Charles Tilly’s theory of revolution to better understand why this revolution has exploded and found no end. Tilly’s theory of revolution is separated into two distinct factors: a revolutionary situation, and a revolutionary outcome (Tilly, 1993). Aforementioned, a weak state or government where the elite are given the necessary tools to succeed while the subject population is left to suffer, and live-in unrest creates a revolutionary situation. For a revolutionary situation to be present, there must be an aggregate of causes; the appearance of two or more sovereignties competing for the power of the state, support from the subject population, and the ruler’s unwillingness or inability to subdue the alternative coalition (Tilly, 1993). In the case of Syria during the Arab Spring, all three components necessary for the presence of a revolution state were, and still are, apparent; much like many of the other countries during this time, there was a hard push against oppressive regimes in the form of pro-democracy protests, which began in early 2011.
These protests presented themselves as the pathway for the opposing sovereignty to gain control and power throughout Syria, in hopes to bring Assad’s regime to an end. The Assad authoritarian regime resembles many of those throughout the other countries experiencing the same revolt and push for democracy. It is important to acknowledge that the economic policies set in place were there to benefit the elites and leave nothing but scraps for the lower class.
Much of the regime’s support stems from the co-optation that Assad’s father Hafiz al-Assad had put into place during his reign over Syria; this system has allowed Asaad to retain the support of the political and business elites (Lesch, 2013). While much of Asaad’s continued reign over the regime can be credited to this support, the protests have remained divided and without a common purpose, leaving the co-opted parties of Asaad believing that his regime is the lesser of two evils. As tensions began to rise, Syria’s situation emulated Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, meaning the perception of the difference between one’s value capabilities and their value expectations (Gurr, 1970). A lack of resources and political opportunity among the lower class led to unrest and feelings of relative deprivation; eventually causing a revolutionary war, with both the masses and the elites reacting to their respective sense of relative deprivation.
The uprising against the Syrian regime came as a surprise to Asaad, it seemed after Syria’s minister of foreign affairs had claimed that the regime’s situation “had never been better” (Zisser, 2012.) The protests against the Syrian regime were minuscule in comparison to those of other countries and seemed as though the cause was not going to escalate throughout the country. Initially, the anti-regime protests began in the south, mainly in Dara’a and its surrounding villages; these peripheries – which the Asaad’s eventually adapted – played a huge role in supporting the Baath party (Zesser, 2012). The turning of these peripheries can be attributed to the years of drought and staggering economic policies that critically damaged the well-being of said villages (Zesser, 2012). As the protests began to gain momentum throughout Syria, it was clear that Asaad’s push back was imminent which led to military action that accounted for the death of protestors (Moussa, Zuber, 2018). This response was the spark that lit the fire for large scale civilian support. While the Syrian military had made its stance clear in the support of Assad, the rebel forces grew stronger and spread throughout the country, eventually bringing the battle to many major Syrian cities, such as the capital, Damascus (Moussa, Zuber, 2018). The formation of second sovereignty was finally upon Syria and had a much different response from Asaad than other leaders throughout the Arab Spring. Asaad’s firm commitment to his regime had plunged Syria into a complete divide, further demonstrating that the use of force can only go so far in mass politics while the opposition continues to gain steam. The revolutionary outcome had finally become apparent as a seemingly never-ending civil war was on the brink of commencing.
The separate outcomes from each country apart of the Arab Spring brought change to each country, but pale in comparison to the still-ongoing civil war Syria is facing. After the Free Syrian Army was formed in July of 2011, it was clear that the Assad regime had more of a fight on their hands than initially anticipated. While the Syrian military had the rebellion outgunned in nearly every aspect of battle, artillery, men, and overall strategy. Yet, Asaad’s forces seemed incapable of extinguishing the insurgency’s spread (Arquilla, 2012). Asaad’s inability to quell the rebellion that adamantly fought for his resignation only further demonstrates the slow collapse of the regime, with support for it both domestically and internationally eroding fast” (Zesser, 2012). Ultimately, neither the rebellion nor the regime had been able to gain the upper hand, leading to a stalemate that prompted an international intervention. Though intervention came on both sides, the support for the rebellion sparked concern that weaponry and control would fall into the wrong hands due to a conglomerate of many different motivating factors. Now, a country still in shambles and covered in bloody warfare, Syria has proven to have a substantially different outcome than those of its Arab Spring counterparts. Sparked by the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were among other countries next to follow in the Arab Spring. Through international intervention, protests, war, and the deaths of thousands, Libya was finally able to reconstruct its government after the death of Qaddafi. Even though violence and disorder plagued Egypt throughout 2011, order was eventually restored as the fall of Mubarak’s government became more apparent (Moussa, Zuber, 2018). These outcomes, among others throughout the Arab world may have spent countless lives on change, but ultimately led to a reformation of the masses and brought about development in the way leaders handle mass politics such as this, not a civil war.
Counter Argument
Although Gurr and Tilly do a good job of describing why the Arab Spring occurred and its different outcomes, there are still gaps in their descriptions. One could argue that Chalmers Johnson’s process theory better explains the Arab Spring revolutions. His process theory describes three variables that produce variability in revolutionary situations and their outcomes (Johnson, 1966). The first variable being the level of structural distortion which is the level of synchronization between people’s values and the values of their government (Johnson, 1966). Across the Arab Spring states desynchronization between the values of the people and the values of the government institutions was rampant. Authoritarian leaders who lived in extravagance ruled over a growing young and educated population who were barred from reaching economic prosperity reading to a disconnect between their values. The second variable is the level of conscious political choice which describes the type of social change that will result from the disconnect. These are the decisions made by governments and other actors that participate in the revolution and are coined as “accelerators” or “precipitating events” (Johnson, 1966). Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the torture of children by the Syrian secret police both acted as precipitating events that acted as a catalyst for revolution (Sarihan, 2014). The third variable is the level of strategy and tactic taken by either the revolutionary or counter-revolutionary force. The tactics and strategy taken by these forces determine what type of revolutionary outcome will occur (Johnson, 1966). The Tunisian army’s choice to side with the protestors over the Ben Ali regime allowed for Tunisia’s revolutionary outcome to be widely different than that of Libya or Syria whose armies responded violently against the revolutionaries. Thus, we see Syria and Libya still struggling with the consequences of those strategies by way of civil war all the while Tunisia is arguably the most democratic Middle Eastern state (Masoud, 2018).
Conclusion
The common perception that the Arab Spring is one singular revolutionary event leads to confusion about the myriad revolutionary outcomes that resulted from pro-democracy protests over the last decade. While the domino-like sequence of protests that took over the Arab world were similar in nature, each uprising led to dissimilar outcomes varying from complete political reform to aggravated oppressive regimes. Charles Tilly, Ted Gurr, and Chalmers Johnson all offer distinct revolutionary theories that allowed for insightful evaluation of the events that took place during the Arab Spring. Tilly’s theory of revolution pertaining to revolutionary situations and outcomes was showcased by Syria and the ongoing civil war that was brought forth by multiple sovereignties and Asaad’s inability to subdue the rebellion. Egypt’s situation and outcome emulated Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation as the populace’s belief that their value capabilities are not meeting the standard of their value expectations. Whether it be Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or any other state involved, the comparable revolutionary situations throughout the Arab Spring all led to drastically disparate outcomes.
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